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PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE:
IMPRACTICAL, BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE
ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI•

The most important thing that must be understood by anyone thinking
about Eastern European privatization is that the word "privatization,"
although correct, is somewhat misleading. It is misleading because it
brings to mind the operations perfonned in many other countries where
state-owned companies have been sold to private individuals. It is very
important to understand that the significance of privatization and the
practicality of privatization in Eastern Europe are quite different. The mo'st
important thing is that the main task of privatization is not to transfer
ownership from one party to another-like that successfully done in
England-but rather to create a market economy. This is something very
new, whereas privatization in England relied on the existence of market
institutions.
State companies that the British government privatiz.ed operated within
a system of free prices. One could easily trace past income from their
books. They operated under a scheme that required their books to reflect
real costs and revenues. There was a proper accounting system, which
allowed analysts to get an idea of the health of the companies.
In comparison, the companies in the East were buying and selling at
prices that were invented by some bureaucrat and, therefore, were not
easily comparable to other countries. You cannot try to correct these
prices by using the world-market price of a given commodity produced in
the East, because with most products there is a different level of quality
and different type of market. As a result, you do not know the health of
a company when you examine its books. Moreover, the word "debt" has
an entirely different meaning for the Eastern European companies. For
example, sometimes forty percent of the value of the assets of a company
are in the fonn of inter-enterprise debts, and one cannot detennine whether
this debt is collectable or not. Like the banking system, the finns were
lending each other money and providing goods without payment or
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knowledge of which companies were solvent. Now, the chances of
collecting the debt are small. And if one were to attempt to collect the
debt, the system would collapse like a house of cards.
Let us look further. The first step in Western privatizations is to hire
professional accountants to value the companies. In Eastern Europe there
are no reliable domestic accounting finns, and the foreign finns that
recently opened do not really know what they are up against because the
books are in such poor condition.
The next step in a "nonnal" privatization is to hire an investment
bank. However, in Eastern Europe companies were never bought or sold.
There is no stock market. There is no market for privatization. The risks
are incalculable because of the uncertainty of future earnings in an everchanging domestic economy. The result is obvious: no investment bank
will ever underwrite securities in these countries. Thus, the Western
experience of privatizing a company is of no value.
In fact, privatization is supposed to create, for the fust time, the
institutions ofa genuine market economy. Privatiz.ation will require most
corporations to set-up institutions to keep proper accounts; set-up proper
corporate structures; create incentives for management; an international
market; a banking structure; and hard budget constraints. For these
reasons, one cannot rely on traditional privatization methods.
The Thatcher government privatiud twelve companies in eight years
with great success. This was a very large section of the British securities
market. But nevertheless, it was only twelve companies in eight years.
Poland, on the other hand, has about 8000 state companies. In Russia,
there are hundreds of thousands. Therefore, if you ti)' to privatize these
companies in the "traditional" way, the pure cost of buying these
companies would be staggering-if you could even do it. The Polish
government, under the misguided influence of foreign advisors, spent
millions of dollars in accounting fees in the first year when it tried to
privatize five companies. These foreign advisors engaged in all kinds of
fantasies about what these companies were worth because nobody could get
any facts. It is a little secret that in the end, state banks bought-out the
shares of some of the companies because there were not enough takers.
Clearly, privatization in Eastern Europe is a very difficult process.
Lessons have been learned and things have changed. However, the plain
truth is that Western privatization methods are of little value to the Eastern
European countries. It is true that these methods might be helpful if you
could find foreign investors; those who would come in and buy raw
materials, or a factory that would produce goods with easily detennined
world export prices. But the fact remains that the Western style of
privatization will be of very little use for the transfonnation of Eastern
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European command economies into market systems.
Some suggest that Western procedures should be simplified and
rapidly applied as a quick-fix: forget proper valuation, sell it more or less
at any price. This suggestion, however, will also fail. Poland is a suitable
example. If we assume that every Pole would invest twenty percent of all
his savings to buy shares of state-owned companies-an entirely unrealistic
assumption since these coql()rations are terrible investments--this would
account for only two percent of the aggregate worth of state-owned
companies. Again, there is the problem of the worth of Eastern European
companies; but if it is assumed that the official valuations are not entirely
unreasonable, it is obvious that trying to sell state-owned companies to the
domestic population is simply hopeless. Not only are there no markets, not
only is it technically infeasible, but the money is not there. In effect, the
government would be giving the stock away. Moreover, this form of giveaway would be unjust because the government would be giving the
companies to those people who could accumulate cash under the old
system. Those who accumulated cash under the old system did so through
either swindling or political subservience. Thus, the state-owned companies cannot be sold domestically, and the question becomes, "can they be
sold to foreigners?"
Realistically, there are not a lot of takers for most of the state-owned
enterprises. There is also a feeling in Eastern European countries that
while it would be good to have foreign investors, it would be improvident
to allow full ownership by foreigners. As a result, you have this schizophrenic attitude--on the one hand, you want money coming in, but on the
other hand, if it turns out that the recently sold state companies are worth
more than the "official" book value, a tremendous political fallout would
result. Just imagine the Easterner's belief: Western investors are out to
make a buck and they are here to control us forever. Realistically, without
foreign investment, Eastern European economies cannot develop. But the
climate for Western investment very often varies from hostile to moderate.
Thus, some other ways must be found in order to transform a very large
proportion of the state industry.
First, companies would not cause total economic chaos. One solution
is to synchronize the collapse of the state sector with the rise of the private
sector. This is in contrast to the big bang solution, which itself is
problematic because it could conceivably cause for(y-percent unemployment from one day to the next. Moreover, I assume that fortY to fifty
percent of the Polish economy would have to be scrapped. I am convinced
that an even greater proportion of the Russian industrial enterprises must
be scrapped. The consequences would be socially unacceptable.
On the other hand, synchronization, industrial policy so to speak, may
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not be any better, because there is no reason to believe that the quality of
government services in Poland, Russia, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary is any
better-my experience is that it is probably worse. Obviously, people have
to survive, so you must plan for unemployment, and you have to have a
policy of supporting small businesses. You must also subsidiz.e certain
types of industry. But executing such a policy, in practice, is totally
impossible for these governments. The ministries are staffed by people
chosen for their political loyalty, not their competence. In addition, there
are a few revolutionaries: great writers who spent many years in jail,
economists who have the great honor of having studied at institutes of
Marxist thought. Therefore, you basically have people with no experience
in conducting government and no idea how companies may be affected by
the constant changes in policies they propose. Thus, any plan of privatization in Eastern Europe that relies too much on the ability of the government to execute a complex policy to manage the transition ignores one of
the most important variables in the transition-the absence of a genuinely
competent government. Eastern Europeans understand that the government
pollutes whatever it touches.
It certainly appears that privatization is an obstacle course that makes
one extremely skeptical about whether something can be done fast. And,
unfortunately, unless you do something fast the state sector very well may
collapse, as it is collapsing in a number of countries. If the budget
collapses, state services decrease and degenerate even further, which lures
the government into the irresistible temptation of going back on the
reforms. Also, if you wait too long, various interest groups will form.
That is, if you do not privatiz.e relatively quickly, these large industries
may form insurmountable political blocks. The unions and the workers
who do not want to lose their jobs are everyday becoming more hostile to
the idea of privatization, and the managers will not increase their personal
stakes in their businesses. Thus, the more the political system reflects the
existing distribution of political forces, the more obvious the absence of
interest groups that really support privatization and capitalism will be.
The move to privatization is basically inspired by an ideology, by
people who believe that in the long-run it is in the best interest of the
country to move into an economy governed by private property. But
nearly nobody will gain in the short-run. There is no constituency for
many of these reforms; on the contrary, every group has a special mindset,
which is detrimental to long-term development. For this reason, I believe
strongly that you have to combine the existing institutions in both the East
and West with a lot of innovation, and basically try to accomplish the task
of privatization by setting up a structure that will "privatize" the process
of privatization. That is, economize on the need for government services
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and economiz.e on the need for a highly trained government bureaucracy.
One wey of doing this is to encourage institutions to engage in the process
of privatization as a business.
Second, you have to have certain foreign components, such as serious
links to foreign capital markets and foreign expertise to assist in setting up
the financial infrastructure of the capitalist system. Managers currently
exist, and some of them can be competent if given the proper incentives,
but no one knows what real banking is about, or what real securities are
about, or even what real corporate government structure is about Thus,
the privatization program must bring in foreign institutions as participants
for profit, but politics dictate that it must withhold full title to the property
being privatwd.
Sufficient numbers of Western investors cannot be brought in to buy
East European industries because there is not enough confidence in the
economy. Thus, Western participation must come in some other fonn,
perhaps as managers of local investment funds. Those brought in to
manage these funds must be brought in by the population at large or a
segment of the population, but not by the government. Capitalism cannot
be created by advisors; it must be created by entrepreneurs. And without
entrepreneurs the privatization process will not succeed.
Finally, privatization programs must be sold to the population. The
local people must have some stake in the program so they will have a
special interest in supporting the refonn. It is not enough to tell these
people that they may starve but in twenty years their children will be fine.
The communists have been telling them that for several years. It does not
sell. Unless the population bonds with the process of transfonnation, it is
going to fail. For example, regardless of what you tell the people in
Czechoslovakia about mass privatization politics, they are still thinking,
"What should I do with these coupons that the government gave me?
Should I invest them with this fund or with that fund?" People have even
begun to look askance at strikers because they have realiz,ed that strikes are
really undennining their investments and economic growth. Therefore,
unless you involve people in this game, even if it is only a game to some
extent, the privatization process, that is, the game of capitalism, will fail.

